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Abstract: The present paper investigates the possibility of political economy incentives behind 
the allocation of the markedly expanded fiscal account of intergovernmental transfers to 
prefectures and municipalities during Metapolitefsi – i.e., the period after the establishment of 
the Third Hellenic Republic (1974 to 1993). Building on a novel dataset of expenses to 
prefectures and subsidies to municipalities, we employ a Difference-in-Differences framework 
and a Regression Discontinuity Design respectively. Our analysis suggests that incumbent 
parties diverted prefectural expenses towards their political strongholds, and subsidies to 
politically aligned mayors. We argue that the expansion of intergovernmental transfers which 
contributed significantly to the derailment of the Greek state resulted from the transformation 
of the political system from traditional patron-client relationships to bureaucratic clientelism. 
On this basis, appointed prefects and politically aligned mayors became major components of 
a centralized party machine to mobilize voters through mass memberships “at the level of the 
town and the village” in the new era of Metapolitefsi. 
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1. Introduction  
The miraculous evolution of the Greek economy during the post-war period came to an abrupt 
end after 1974 (see e.g. Alogoskoufis, 1995; Moutos and Pechlivanos, 2015). This is the year 
that democracy is restored in Greece after a brief military junta (1967-1974) and the Third 
Hellenic Republic is established, thereafter referred to as the Metapolitefsi (i.e., change of 
regime).1 Prior to this era, the annual output growth of the Greek economy from 1953 to 1973 
was on average close to 7 percent (exceeding by about 2-3 percentage points the OECD 
average), the annual inflation rate was on average below 4 percent, and the primary public 
deficits were rarely higher than 2 percent of GDP.2 From 1974 to 1993 this macroeconomic 
performance was completely reversed. In particular, this period was characterized by 
substantially lower annual growth rates of output (in most of the years lower than 2 percent), 
high levels of inflation (around 18-20 percent), and persistently high levels of primary public 
deficits that resulted in the explosion of public debt from 17.5 percent of GDP in 1974 to 97.6 
percent in 1993 (see Figure 1). The latter, contributed to a highly painful vicious cycle of fiscal 
destabilization that has been haunting the Greek economy ever since (see e.g., Meghir et al., 
2017; Alogoskoufis, 2019). 
 
[Insert Figure 1, here] 
 
Most of the existing studies attribute this radical turn in macroeconomic performance 
to the big institutional regime switch of Metapolitefsi (see Alogoskoufis, 1995; Katsimi and 
Moutos, 2010; Moutos and Pechlivanos, 2015). Particularly, until 1974 the Greek state was 
powerful and autocratic (both politically and economically) and the government had substantial 
control over the economy through effective influence on labour unions and direct control on 
the banking and financial system. This institutional framework was ensuring efficient 
 
1 The relevant literature usually defines four distinct periods in post-war Greek economic history: (i) 1944-1952 
the period of International Aid and Reconstruction; (ii) 1953-1973 the economic transformation and catching up 
period; (iii) 1974-1993 the restoration of democracy and redistribution period; and (iv) 1994-2008 the last period 
before the sovereign debt crisis that is characterized by a further expansion (along with some rationalisation) of 
the welfare state, fast growth rates and EMU entry (see, e.g., Moutos and Pechlivanos, 2015; Kostis, 2019). 
Following this categorization, the paper at hand places the spotlight on the third period (1974-1993) characterized 
by fiscal destabilization and radical turnaround in macroeconomic performance. 
2 From 1953 to 1973 Greece was the second most rapidly developing economy among OECD countries. The first 
one was Japan (see Meghir et al., 2017; Kostis, 2019). During this period, the share of services in GDP remained 
constant (around 50 percent), whereas the share of secondary sector increased from 20 percent in 1953 to 35 
percent in 1973. So, this performance does not reflect solely a catching up process, but a more structural shift of 
the economy from low productivity sectors (i.e., agriculture) to high productivity ones (i.e., manufacturing) (see 
Moutos and Pechlivanos, 2015).   
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commitment and coordination mechanisms that guaranteed high return to capital and fostered 
private investment and economic growth (see e.g., Alogoskoufis, 1995; Iordanoglou, 2020). At 
the same time, the monetary policy was tight -due to the participation of drachma on the Bretton 
Woods system- and the fiscal policy highly disciplined.3  
After the restoration of democracy on July 24, 1974, the above-mentioned checks and 
balances gradually disappeared, and a new institutional and political framework emerged. 
According to this view, Metapolitefsi produced an economic environment that was 
discouraging private investment through increased uncertainty, while it prioritized politically 
motivated redistributive policies (see Meghir et al., 2017; Kostis, 2019). Social groups (such 
as small business owners, merchants, independent professionals, and small farmers) gained 
significant political power and the elected governments were struggling to satisfy their 
demands for redistribution by increasing the public sector and by persistently running large 
public deficits.4 It has been argued that the restoration of democracy and the collapse of the 
previous institutional regime was viewed by the majority of the electorate “[…] as an 
opportunity of a less centralized political system and redistribution of power among the 
country’s regions and social groups” (see Alogoskoufis, 2019).  
Public demand for a less centralized political system brought fundamental changes on 
the organizational structure of the Greek political parties and consequently on the nature of the 
clientelistic relations through which the political system until then was mobilizing mass 
support. Starting from Lyrintzis (1984) and Mavrogordatos (1983; 1997), many scholars 
suggest that, after the restoration of democracy, the pre-junta party system, which was based 
on traditional interpersonal patron-client relationships, was transformed fundamentally. In 
particular, the new parties that emerged were characterized by stronger organizational structure 
and clientelistic networks that are described by the relevant literature as “bureaucratic 
clientelism” or “machine politics” (see, e.g., Mavrogordatos, 1997).5 Does this transformation 
 
3 It must be noted that the economic regime which prevailed during the “Regime of the Colonels” (1967-1974) 
was basically a continuation of the policies adopted by democratic governments during the 1950’s and the 1960’s 
(see Alogoskoufis,1995 for more details on this).  
4 We must highlight that during that period, Greece was also a newly established democracy. Starting from Linz 
and Stepan (1996), there is a large strand of the literature which suggests that increased budget deficits and fiscal 
manipulation have often been employed as instruments by newly established democratic governments in order to 
convince citizens that democracy is superior to any other form of governance and to consolidate the pro-
democratic institutions (see Brender and Drazen 2007; Kammas and Sarantides, 2016).  
5 To better understand the different types of clientelistic ties that we observe in Greek politics through time, we 
should make clear the distinction between traditional clientelism and machine politics (for more details on this 
see Mavrogordatos, 1983; 1997). The typical structure of traditional clientelism are patron-client relationships 
that form pyramids with members of parliament (MPs) or other politicians at the top, local party bosses 
(kommatarches) in the middle and individual voters (typically peasants) at the base. In this case, the clientelistic 
ties are interpersonal and the networks of local bosses and middlemen belongs personally to the MPs. (It was a 
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of the political system, from traditional patronage to machine politics, lie behind the explosion 
of government debt after the restoration of democracy? To what extent the organizational 
structure of the post-junta dominant Greek parties and the consequent intra party politics may 
have contributed to the vicious cycle of fiscal destabilization that followed ever since? 
The paper at hand seeks to answer the above questions by investigating the potential 
political economy motives behind the allocation of intergovernmental transfers to prefectures 
and municipalities during the first two decades that democracy is restored (i.e., from 1974-
1993). Both appointed prefects and aligned mayors were important allies of the centralized 
parties’ machines to mobilize voters through mass memberships “at the level of the town and 
the village” in the new era of Metapolitefsi. It is worth noting that expenses to prefectures and 
subsidies to municipalities increased substantially during the period under investigation 
contributing greatly to the fiscal derailment.6 More precisely, expenses to prefectures increased 
by almost 600 percent in real per capita terms between 1974-1993, whereas subsidies to 
municipalities increased by around 1000 percent in real per capita terms during the same period 
(see below for more details on this). Therefore, a detailed investigation of political distortions 
behind their allocation appears to be sine qua non as to understand the functioning of the whole 
political system during Metapolitefsi. A further advantage of focusing on the allocation of 
intergovernmental transfers is that we can observe the final target of the benefit (i.e., the 
prefecture or the mayor that receives the transfer), which allows the use of estimation 
techniques that address a series of important identification concerns. 
In particular, the empirical analysis takes place along two layers, namely prefectures 
and municipalities. In the former, we employ a Difference-in-Differences (DD) framework to 
investigate how changes in the distribution of political support between the conservative (1974-
1981) and socialist (1981-1989) governments affected the regional allocation of the budget 
towards appointed prefects. In the latter, we adopt a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) 
 
common practice these networks (factions) to be transmitted as inheritance -or even as dowry- within the same 
family from one generation to the other). It is obvious that in such a context the MPs are the ultimate centre of 
political power and consequently parties were built structurally around these networks of local notables. The 
absence of effective party organization and mass membership constituted party’s parliamentary group extremely 
powerful (this situation is often described as vouleftokratia (“rule of the MPs”) in the relevant literature). In 
contrast, bureaucratic clientelism or machine politics is defined as the situation that the party machine is powerful 
and the clientelistic linkages are impersonal and belong to the party rather than to individual politicians. In such 
a context, the collective organs and the party bureaucracy become the actual centres of political power. 
6 The relevant literature usually highlights the growth in: (i) social transfers (especially spending on pensions); 
and (ii) compensation of public employees (due to increases in both the numbers of public employees as well as 
their real wages) as the main driving forces behind the fiscal destabilization (see Moutos and Tsitsikas, 2010; 
Kostis, 2019). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which investigates how central government 
transfers contributed to the significant growth of the public debt. 
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in close mayoral electoral races following the rationale and the empirical methodology 
suggested by Lee (2008). Empirical findings provide strong evidence of political distortions 
behind the allocation of intergovernmental transfers to prefectures and municipalities during 
Metapolitefsi.  
Specifically, the analysis suggests inflated budgets towards appointed prefects in 
regions characterized by stronger political support for the incumbent (i.e., political strongholds) 
- especially during the electoral and pre-electoral years of national elections. Moreover, we 
show that mayors who are politically aligned with the government received larger amounts of 
subsidies. In both cases, appointed prefects and politically aligned mayors could be important 
allies of the incumbents at the local level in national elections, consisting major components of 
the transformed clientelistic networks in the new era of Metapolitefsi (see e.g., Mavrogordatos, 
1997).7  
The rest of the paper is organized along the following lines. Section 2 provides a brief 
description of the Greek political landscape, and discusses how the restoration of democracy 
affected the evolution of public finances. Sections 3 and 4 present the estimation strategy and 
the empirical findings at the prefecture and municipality level respectively. Finally, Section 5 
offers our concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Greek political landscape and the evolution of public finances 
In this section, we describe how increased demand for a less centralized political system 
brought fundamental changes on the organizational structure of political parties after the 
restoration of democracy - and in turn how this affected the type of the clientelistic relationships 
and consequently the implemented fiscal policy. To this end, we begin with a short description 
of the political forces that formed the pre-junta party system, then we proceed by focusing on 
the political parties which dominated the post-junta Greek politics, and, finally, we analyse the 




2.1 The pre-junta political system (1952-1967) 
 
7 In the new era of bureaucratic clientelism, the relative political power of appointed prefects and mayors 
increased substantially, since they became major links between the local grassroots of the party and the party 
machine (see, Elephantis, 1981 for more details on this). In contrast, before 1974, the relative political power of 
the MPs was, by far, more significant and this is the reason why the political context during that period was usually 
described as vouleftokratia (i.e., “rule of the MPs”) (for more details on this, see Mavrogordatos, 1983; 1997). 
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The system that emerged after the occupation of Greece by the Axis forces (1941-1944) and 
the subsequent Greek Civil War (GCW) (1946-1949)8, consisted basically of three major 
political groups that could be identified as the Right, the Center and the Left (see 
Nicolacopoulos, 2001). The dominant right-wing parties were the Greek Rally (Hellinikos 
Synagermos) founded in 1951 by Alexander Papagos, and after Papagos’s death (in 1955) the 
National Radical Union (ERE - Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis) founded by Constantine 
Karamanlis. The Rally’s victory in the national elections of 1952 established a long period of 
uninterrupted right-wing governments (1952-1963). During the same period, the Center did not 
manage to remain united. The fragmentation of this political group only ended in 1961, when 
the Center Union (Enossis Kentrou) was formed bringing together the various center groups 
under the leadership of George Papandreou. The Center Union won the national elections of 
1963 and 1964, but remained in power only until 1965 when the King intervened in party 
politics and the party was finally split.  
For the purposes of our analysis, it is important to highlight that both the Center Union 
and ERE (as well as the Greek Rally) were political parties characterized by weak 
organizational structure and absence of mass membership. Without a strong party machine -
that would mobilize the voters- these parties were based on networks of well-known politicians 
leading strong local and regional factions (see Lyrintzis, 1984; Meynaud, 2002).9 Therefore, 
their political power was highly dependent on the effectiveness of these traditional 
interpersonal patron-client relationships between local politicians (usually members of 
parliament) and individual voters (see, e.g. Mavrogordatos, 1997).10 In such a context, the 
party’s MPs was a major centre of political power, and therefore party leadership had to 
cooperate with it and take into account its view over a large number of issues. This situation of 
traditional patronage is often described in the relevant literature as vouleftokratia (i.e., “rule of 
 
8 The cost of the GCW was terrifyingly high in terms of human losses, but also the cost for the economy was huge 
resulting in a missed opportunity for a quick post-war recovery along the other European nations (see 
Christodoulakis, 2015). 
9 The quest for development of modern parties out of the maze of factions goes back to the second half of the 19 th 
century. In particular, the first serious attempt to transform the various factions (the so-called fatriae) into 
principled parties was made around the mid-1870s by the Prime Minister Charilaos Trikoupis (see, e.g., Legg, 
1969; Pappas, 1999; Hering, 2008). More specifically, Trikoupis attempted to modernize the country’s political 
life by “transforming parties from personal to real, and to reduce their number from many to two”. Although 
Trikoupis failed to establish a political environment characterized by modern parties with solid organizational 
structure (i.e., party machine branches throughout the country) and a certain set of programmatic principles, a first 
step was made towards this direction under his rulership. It has been argued that during that period the Greek 
political system was transformed from a context in which only pure factions existed (that is factions qua parties) 
to one characterized by parties composed by factions (see, e.g., Pappas, 1999).   
10 Although ERE was the archetypical party of local notables, the Center Union also failed to develop a strong 
bureaucratic machine and followed the traditional organizational structure of the post-war Greek parties. The only 
exception to this, was the party organization of the youth people of Center Union (see e.g., Meynaud, 2002).  
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the MPs”).11 This does not imply that the party leadership was politically weak compared to 
the parliamentary group. Especially in the case of ERE, the party leader (i.e., Constantine 
Karamanlis) was politically very powerful (see e.g., Pappas, 1999; Meynaud, 2002). It means, 
however, that in the absence of an autonomous party organization, the intra-party power was 
concentrated at the hands of the party’s leader and the party’s parliamentary group and 
therefore the political system was highly centralized (see e.g., Meynaud, 2002).  
 
2.2 The post-junta political system (1974-1993) 
Most of the comparative studies which investigate the patterns of the political forces in Greece 
before and after the “Regime of the Colonels”, highlight the deep structural changes which 
occurred between 1966 and 1974 (see e.g., Lyrintzis, 1984; Pappas, 1999). More precisely, 
none of the pre-junta political parties survived in its previous form and the new parties that 
were created, diverged substantially from their predecessors in structure, functioning and 
program. The most impressive event of this period was, definitely, the immediate rise of the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK - PAnellinio Socialistiko Kinima). PASOK was 
founded on September 3, 1974 by Andreas Papandreou and seven years later (in the elections 
of 1981) had achieved to come into office by fully absorbing previous political formations of 
the Centre (see Nicolacopoulos, 2005). During the same period (on September 26, 1974), 
Constantine Karamanlis announced the formation of the New Democracy (ND - Nea 
Dimokratia) party by emphasizing that ND was a “new political movement” and not the party 
of ERE under a different name (see Loulis, 1981). Before looking individually at the 
organizational structure of these two political forces that dominated the post-junta Greek 
politics, it is necessary to briefly describe the general political and electoral context during 
Metapolitefsi.  
In the first parliamentary elections that took place on November 17, 1974, ND won a 
landslide victory with 54 percent of the valid votes cast. Other new parties that appeared were 
the second-power Centre Union-New Forces (EK-ND - Enosi Kentrou-Nees Dynameis) under 
Georgios Mavros that achieved 20.4 percent, and PASOK which came third with 13.6 percent 
of the valid votes cast. In the elections of 1977, ND retained its majority with 41.84 percent, 
though the big surprise was the success of PASOK which almost doubled its electoral strength 
 
11 It must be noted that both leaderships of Constantine Karamanlis and George Papandreou had been decided by 
the groups of MPs of the relevant parties without intervention of any other administrative body (e.g., Party 
Congress, General Committee) (see Meynaud, 2002, for more details on this).  
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(25.3 percent) and so became the main opposition party.12 In 1981, PASOK won the elections 
with 48.1 percent - against the 35.9 percent of ND – and Andreas Papandreou formed the first 
socialist government in the history of Greece. Then, in 1985, PASOK won its second four-year 
term in government with 45.8 percent, despite the relative rise of ND (40.8 percent) under the 
new leadership of Konstantinos Mitsotakis. Finally, after two elections in 1989 that ND won, 
but failed to form a parliamentary majority, gained a majority of only two MPs in the Greek 
parliament after its win with 8 percentage points in the election of April 1990. 
By focusing on the issue of the organizational structure, PASOK was the first non-
communist mass party in Greece.13 Although it absorbed several personalistic patronage 
networks associated with the old Center Union party, it formed an extensive national network 
based on both local and regional branches with thousands of members (see Pappas, 2009; 
Kalyvas, 2015). For the purposes of our analysis, it is important to note that, according to 
PASOK’s leader Andreas Papandreou, the traditional organizational pyramid of pre-junta 
political parties had failed to include the base of the pyramid on their decision process. The 
strategy of PASOK, according to its leader, was to enforce the “democratic procedures by 
creating grassroots organizations at the level of the village and town […] so as to promote the 
genuine expression of popular opinion on general development targets and on the national 
political options of our country” (see e.g., Elephantis, 1981). Thus, PASOK from its very 
beginning gave absolute priority to the development of local and regional organizations, 
creating a wide network of grassroots movements and a rank-and-file organization which 
developed through the whole country (see, e.g., Elephantis, 1981; Lyrintzis, 1984). This 
procedure of “political decentralization” induced substantial increase in the relative political 
power of the party committee at the prefectural level and of the mayors, since both became 
major organizational links between the party machine and the masses (see Elephantis, 1981). 
In this new political environment -characterized by a new kind of intra party politics- the 
prefectural party committee becomes the actual center of political power within the party that 
even the MPs have to cooperate with (see Mavrogordatos, 1997).  
 During the same period, the ND leadership made also a significant effort to develop a 
strong party organization with a large number of active members. According to Constantine 
 
12 Because of PASOK's success, the vote share obtained by George Mavros' centrist party slumped to 11.95 
percent, leading within a few years to its gradual disintegration from the political system (Mavrogordatos, 1984). 
13 The Greek left has traditionally been identified with the Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistiko Komma 
Ellados). KKE was characterized from its very beginning by a well-organized mass base and a highly-centralized 
structure. Therefore, KKE was definitely the first mass party in Greece (see Elephantis, 1981; Lyrintzis, 1984, for 
more details on this). 
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Karamanlis, old-style parties of notables like ERE and Centre Union -which were lacking 
autonomous organization and mass memberships and were based on semiautonomous 
politicians who were commanding local factions of personally-loyal voters- could not survive 
in the new post-junta political environment (see Pappas, 1999). The politically autocratic Greek 
state of the pre-junta period had ceased to exist and, therefore, the political parties were 
deprived from support by external institutions (e.g., the King). In this new era, the parties 
should rely on their own forces and organize a centralized party machine to mobilize voters 
through mass memberships (see Pappas, 1999). To this end, in September of 1975, ND formed 
its first 50 regional organizations and 40 local organizations. Until the April of 1976, the 
number of local organizations had risen to 233 and the party memberships were approximately 
20.000 (see Loulis, 1981). Although these figures highlight the considerable efforts of the party 
to recruit members and to develop an autonomous party machine, the overall result was not 
very satisfactory. This becomes obvious if one considers that, during the same period, PASOK 
had already 27.000 members (that represented a 4 percent of its vote) and a much wider 
network of 460 local organizations and 500 cells. (i.e., a highly-decentralized level of 
organization that was totally absent from the organizational structure of ND).14 
 The political empowerment of parties’ local organizations, and the consequent upgrade 
of the prefects and mayors, was accompanied by a significant increase of central government 
spending allocated to prefectures and municipalities (see Section 2.3 for more details on this). 
This is because in the new political environment of Metapolitefsi, appointed prefects and 
politically aligned mayors became chief components of the party machine and functioned as 
an arm of the governing party “at the level of the town and the village”.  
 
2.3 The evolution of public finances since Metapolitefsi 
After the restoration of democracy in 1974, a period of fiscal laxity started, which became 
worse in the late 1970s and continued until the early 1990s. As shown in Figure 2, the Greek 
state was expanding persistently during Metapolitefsi, running at the same time growing 
primary public deficits that led to the explosion of the public debt from 17.5 percent of GDP 
in 1974 to 97.6 percent in 1993 (see Figure 1). By employing aggregate data, previous studies 
highlight several political economy motives behind the observed fiscal destabilization (see e.g., 
Moutos and Tsitsikas, 2010; Moutos and Pechlivanos, 2015). Among these motives, there is 
evidence of political budget cycles (PBC) from 1974 to 1993 (see e.g., Lockwood et al., 2001). 
 
14 See Loulis (1981) and Kalyvas (2015) for further details. 
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In other words, the Greek governments manipulated fiscal policy instruments in order to 
increase their re-election chances. Figure 3 supports this evidence by showing that total public 
expenses and the budget deficit increase on average by 3.9 and 2.7 percentage points of GDP, 
respectively, during election years.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 and 3, here] 
 
We argue that the most significant cause of the fiscal derailment was the transformation of the 
political system and the associated increased fiscal needs of the governing parties to develop 
and support the party machine. Our analysis places the spotlight on the evolution of 
intergovernmental transfers to prefectures and municipalities. The reason is threefold. First, 
intergovernmental transfers increased substantially during the period under investigation, 
contributing greatly to the fiscal derailment. It is worth noting that the correlation between 
government debt and intergovernmental transfers to prefectures and municipalities during 
1974-1993 is 90 and 96 percent, respectively. Despite that, this is the first study which 
investigates the political economy forces behind this specific government spending account. 
Second, a big advantage of focusing on this fiscal account is that we can observe the final target 
of the benefit (i.e., the prefecture or the mayor that receives the transfer), allowing the use of 
estimation techniques that address a series of important identification concerns. Third, from a 
theoretical point of view, both appointed prefects and aligned mayors were important allies of 
the centralized parties’ machines to mobilize voters through mass memberships “at the level of 
the town and the village” in the new era of Metapolitefsi (see e.g., Mavrogordatos, 1997). 
Therefore, we would expect significant political distortions in the spatial allocation of the 
inflated fiscal account of intergovernmental transfers within the Greek territory. 
Regarding the budget allocated to prefectures, as can be seen in Figure 4, it increased 
by almost 600 percent in real per capita terms between 1975-1993 - predominantly driven by 
the administration of PASOK between 1982-1989. At its peak in 1989, prefectural expenses 
accounted for 7.6 percent of the total budget of the general government. This account includes 
expenses of the prefectures for wages and salaries and services in various sectors, such as health 
and education.15  
 
 
15 It should be noted though that this account does not include funds transferred to prefectures as part of the Public 
Investment Budget that inflated also during the same period (see, Kammas et al., 2020). 
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[Insert Figure 4, here] 
 
Municipalities receive subsidies from the central government which can be separated 
into two main categories. First, non-discretionary (formula-based) subsidies from the state 
budget. These are constituted primarily by socioeconomic, demographic and spatial variables 
that are specified as normative variables. Second, discretionary subsidies, that are compatible 
with local public services of each municipality. This type of subsidies consists of three 
components: subsidies allocated from the central government to local authorities for public 
works in an effort to decrease local unemployment; discretionary subsides allocated from the 
central government to municipalities via regional (prefectures) authorities; and miscellaneous 
subsidies authorized from the central government. Figure 5 shows the evolution of 
discretionary and non-discretionary subsidies to municipalities expressed in real per capita 
terms. Both types of subsidies increased (significantly) by around 1000 percent between 1975-
1993. Figure B1, in the Appendix, shows subsidies expressed as a percentage of the total budget 
of municipal authorities. In 1975, total municipal subsidies account for around 18 percent of 
the municipal budget, whereas by 1993 this figure increases to 45 percent. Given that municipal 
budgets expanded on average by almost 200 percent between 1975-1993, two regularities stand 
out. First, the expansion of municipal budgets was driven by state funding - not by funds raised 
by local authorities. Second, over time municipal authorities became more dependent on 
discretionary funding determined and allocated by the central government. In particular, 
discretionary subsidies rise proportionally more in comparison to formula-based subsidies over 
time, and in 1985 the former account for 61 percent of total subsidies.  
 
[Insert Figure 5, here] 
 
 
3. The Prefectural Level of Analysis  
3.1 Data 
The Modern Greek state consists of the central state, mainly ministries and similar national 
institutions, and the local government agencies. During the early years of Metapolitefsi, local 
administration was divided in two levels: the prefectural units (Level 2), and the municipalities 
and communities (Level 1). In particular, Greece was organized in 52 prefectures (NUTS-3), 
whereas the number of municipalities (LAU-1) and communities (LAU-2) in each prefecture 
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varies across time.16 Up until the mid-1980s Greece consisted of 5,775 municipalities and 
communities, whereas more than 80 percent of these rural municipalities and communities had 
less than 1,000 inhabitants. As a result, their majority could not take over a significant part of 
public responsibilities. Overall, Greece has been described as one of the most centralist states 
in Europe, with local authorities restricted to residual tasks (Hlepas, 2003). This started to 
change after 1981, an era where PASOK undertook some reform efforts (Christofilopoulou, 
1991). Despite that, local administration remained without independent taxing authority, poor 
financial resources and growing dependence on the central government (see Hlepas, 2003; 
2011). In this section, our analysis aims to investigate the possibility of political bias in the 
allocation of central government budget to the appointed prefects17, by constructing the 
variable prefectural expenses expressed in real per capita terms. 
Moreover, using the outcomes of legislative elections of 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985 and 
1989, we construct the variable victory margin for the period 1975-1993.18 This is the 
difference between the incumbent share and the opposition share19, relative to the entire voting-
eligible population.20 Figure B2 in the Appendix maps the victory margin of ND and PASOK 
after their first electoral wins in the elections of 1974 and 1981, respectively, at the prefectural 
level (NUTS-3). As it can be seen, areas in the Peloponnese region voted strongly over time in 
favour of ND, while prefectures in the Crete Island (in the southern part of the Aegean Sea) are 
political strongholds of PASOK. Explicit definitions, descriptive statistics and sources of the 
variables employed throughout the prefectural analysis, are provided in Table B1 in the 
Appendix. 
Finally, in the analysis that follows, we add a number of covariates that are expected to 
affect the allocated budget to prefectures. In particular, the matrix of prefecture-level 
 
16 NUTS is a geocode standard of EUROSTAT, the Statistical Office of the European Union, which stands for 
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. LAU denotes Local Administrative Units, which are building 
blocks of the NUTS, and comprise the municipalities within each country of the European Union.  
17 This changed with Law 2218/1994 which introduced the election of prefects and prefectural councils along with 
mayors and municipal elections. See Lavdas (1997) for a historical analysis.  
18 Specifically, we forward prefecture level electoral results up to (and including) the year of the next general 
election (see, e.g., Jablonski, 2014). For instance, we forward the election results of 1974 up to (and including) 
the next election year of 1977. In addition, we restrict our dataset after 1975 because this is the first year that the 
incumbent party of ND had discretion over fiscal policy after its victory in the election held in November of 1974.  
19 The opposition share is the share of votes received by the two leading opposition parties between 1975-1981 
(i.e, EK-ND and PASOK), or the leading opposition party between 1982-1993 (i.e., ND). The reason for this 
differentiation is that during 1982-1993 we have a dominant opposition party (ND between 1982-1989 and 
PASOK between 1990-1993), while between 1974-1981 the centrist party EK-ND and PASOK alter in the second 
and third place with the summation of their strength close to 35 percent. More importantly, as explained above, 
PASOK absorbed the majority of EK-ND supporters in the transition of its growing influence. 
20 We opt for this measurement since it allows us to better account for endogenous turnout (see Spenkuch and 
Tillmann, 2018). However, in robustness checks reported in the Appendix, we use voting shares relative to valid 
votes cast and our results remain unaffected. 
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observable characteristics includes the population of each prefecture (population); the share of 
households with access to electricity (electricity); the share of individuals employed in the 
agricultural sector (agriculture); and the share of individuals who are illiterate (illiterates). We 
use these variables in order to capture the effect of urbanisation, prosperity and development 
that are expected to affect the allocation of regional allocation of transfers from the central 
government (see Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Joannis, 2011).  
 
3.2 Fixed effects regressions 
To estimate the association between political support and prefectural expenses, we begin by 
estimating a prefecture-level fixed-effects model of the following form:  
 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (1) 
 
where 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 denotes the natural logarithm of real per capita prefectural 
expenses in prefecture i at time t; 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡, which is the main variable of interest, 
refers to prefecture i in the last election; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables as described above. 
The model also includes prefecture, δi, and year fixed effects, γt, to control for time-invariant 
prefecture characteristics and shocks common to all prefectures. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term 
clustered at the prefecture level. According to our theoretical priors, the coefficient on victory 
margin must have a positive sign.  
Table 1 displays our first empirical results. We can notice in column (1) that the 
coefficient on victory margin is positive and highly significant indicating that incumbent 
parties tended to divert prefectural expenses in their strongholds. Qualitatively, our estimate 
suggests that prefectures with the highest value of victory margin receive, on average, a 12 
percent higher budget in comparison to prefectures with the lowest value.21  
Our next task is to examine whether the association observed between political support 
and prefectural expenses is stronger around electoral years. To this end, we estimate the 
following equation: 
 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (2) 
 
21 Given that the outcome is logged Greek Drachmas per capita, the percentage change effect is calculated by eλ 
− 1, with λ being the estimated coefficient on victory margin (α1) multiplied by the distance between the maximum 




As it can be seen, Equation (2) has been augmented with the interaction term 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡. Given that national election years are constant within 
prefecture years, only the coefficients of victory margin and the interaction term between the 
latter and election are reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1. We use two different versions 
of the variable election in our estimates: (i) it takes the value 1 in national election years (e.g., 
1981), and 0 otherwise; (ii) it takes the value 1 both in national election and pre-election years 
(e.g., 1980-1981), and 0 otherwise. As shown in Table 1, only the coefficient of the interaction 
term in column (3) is positive and statistically significant. Overall, this indicates that incumbent 
parties tended to divert prefectural expenses in their strongholds, and even more so during the 
electoral and pre-electoral years of national elections. In Appendix B, we re-run these estimates 
using political support variables as shares of valid votes cast and testing for outlier 
observations. As can be seen in Tables B4-B5 the relationship between political support and 
prefectural expenses remains intact. 
 
[Insert Table 1, here] 
 
3.3 Difference-in-Differences estimates 
In this sub-section, we exploit the political change that occurred in 1981 as a source of 
exogenous variation in the distribution of political support within the Greek territory, and we 
employ a DD specification between 1975-1989 (i.e., the years before and after the political 
change). This specification allows us to explore whether there are ND or PASOK specific 
interactions driving the allocation of prefectural expenses, and takes the following form (see, 
e.g., Jablonski, 2014; Anaxagorou et al., 2020): 
 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∙ 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (3) 
 
where the variable 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 in years greater than 
or equal to 1982, and 0 otherwise when PASOK is in power (PASOKt), whereas its values are 
reversed when we estimate the effect of the ND regime (NDt). In addition, when PASOKt (NDt) 
is interacted with 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖, the latter takes the values of the victory margin of PASOK 
(ND) in the election of 1981 (1974) - 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛1981 (𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛1974).  
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Given that 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 is constant within prefectures and 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡 is constant 
within prefecture years, only the interaction between the two remains in the model and is 
captured by the parameter 𝛼1. This methodology builds on the idea that PASOK's (ND’s) 
political support should only affect the allocation of prefectural expenses during 1982-1989 
(1975-1981) when the party is in power. Thus, by subtracting the effect of victory margin 
during the PASOK (ND) regime from their effect during the ND (PASOK) regime, 𝛼1 provides 
a reasonable estimate of the extent to which each party shaped the allocation of budget to 
prefectures within the Greek territory. We prefer fixed measures to estimate the effect of the 
two parties - 1981 (1974) victory margin of PASOK (ND) - since it is less likely to be 
endogenous to investment trends than a voting share which changes over time (see e.g., 
Carruthers and Wanamaker, 2015). Of course, even fixed voting shares across prefectures are 
not exogenously assigned and can be correlated with potential confounders. To mitigate this 
issue, as in the previous section, our estimations include prefecture (δi) and year fixed effects 
(𝛾𝑡). Moreover, covariates in vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡, as discussed above, are employed to control for 
important time-variant factors that could still confound these estimates. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term clustered at the prefecture i level.  
As can be seen in columns (1) and (3) of Table 2, both DD coefficients 
(𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑂𝐾𝑡 ∙ 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛1981; 𝑁𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛1974) are positive and statistically 
significant indicating a bias in the allocation of prefectural expenses by both parties. However, 
it should be noted that the estimated coefficient for the administration period of PASOK is 
three times higher. Moreover, as we rely on a voting share from a point in time that increases 
measurement error in other years, in columns (2) and (4) we opt to reduce our sample between 
1978-1985, namely the last term of ND and the first term of PASOK. As it can be seen, our 
DD coefficients remain positive and statistically significant, suggesting for one more time 
political distortions in the allocation of prefectural expenses. In Table B6 in Appendix B, we 
present the robustness checks of the DD estimates: (i) we use political support variables as 
shares of valid votes cast; (ii) we test for outlier observations; (iii) we expand the sample 
between 1975-1993; (iv) we allow the effect of PASOK and ND administration to vary over 
two horizons during their terms in office; (v) we test the parallel trend hypothesis for the 
administration of PASOK. Additional discussions of these tests are provided in Section A1 in 
Appendix A. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that prefectural expenses was a 




[Insert Table 2, here] 
 
4. The Municipal Level of Analysis 
4.1 Institutional background 
Municipalities in Greece operate under uniform fiscal rules and are ‘financially dependent’, as 
they receive significant subsidies from the central government (see Figures 5 and Figure B1 in 
Appendix B). Although municipalities were restricted to residual tasks, during the early 1980s 
local authorities were empowered to provide social services and were encouraged to promote 
sporting and cultural activities, urban development, and the supervision of responsibilities for 
local businesses and trade among others (see Hlepas, 2010).22 This can explain, at least partly, 
the inflation of municipal budgets observed over time since the restoration of democracy. 
Despite this change, financial discretion (own tax revenue) remained limited over the same 
period, reflecting an increasing dependence from the funds allocated by the central government 
(see Tatsos, 1998). 
 Local elections use electoral lists and, therefore, mayoral candidates do not officially 
belong to any party which, in principle, ensures independence. However, mayoral candidates, 
as individuals, can be directly affiliated to a political party by being a member. Also, electoral 
lists, where the mayoral candidate is the head runner, could be endorsed or indirectly supported 
by a political party. Therefore, candidates at local elections do not run under the official name 
of any party, however voters can recognize the political identity of the candidate (see 
Chortareas et al., 2016). Mayoral candidates should obtain 50 percent plus one vote of the total 
valid votes in order to get elected. In case that no candidate is able to pass this threshold, then 
the first two candidates are transferred to the second electoral round where the winner is the 
candidate with the largest vote share. 
The first local elections, after the military junta, took place in 1975, four months after 
the national elections of 1974. The next municipal elections were held in 1978, following the 
national elections of 1977. During both these terms, ND is in power. The next two local 
elections were held in 1982 and 1986, months after the wins of PASOK in the national elections 
of 1981 and 1985 respectively. The final election included in our sample took place in 1990, 
 
22 New duties and additional funds could not affect the majority of municipalities and communities which, due to 
their size, were not in position to carry out the new responsibilities. In an effort to solve this problem, the Greek 
Socialists forwarded in 1984 (Law 1416/1984) voluntary amalgamations of smaller communes through subsidies 
and other incentives. Some years later, the result was not considered satisfactory. Only 367 small 
municipalities/communities (less than 10 percent of the target group) had responded to the state incentives, 
voluntarily merging into 108 geographical units (see Hlepas, 2011). 
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when ND again came to power after the national election of 1989. Due to data availability 
issues, our sample does not include the local election of 1975, which took place immediately 
after the restoration of democracy.  
 
4.2. Municipal data 
The majority of mayors are, directly or indirectly, affiliated with the two main political parties 
that dominated the political landscape since the restoration of democracy. Our aim is to 
examine whether political alignment matters for the allocation of subsidies to municipalities 
for the period 1979-1993 – i.e., after the local elections of 1978, 1982, 1986 and 1990. To this 
end, our main dependent variable is the real per capita discretionary intergovernmental 
subsidies (subsidiesit) received by municipality i during term t.23 Alternatively, we experiment 
with regular (formula-based) subsidies of the central government to municipalities, namely 
non-discretionary subsidiesit. Greece has a varying number of municipalities (for which fiscal 
data are available) during our sample period, starting from 267 in 1979 and ending with 304 
municipalities in 1993. Figure B3 in Appendix B shows the administrative boundaries of these 
municipalities. 
Data of local electoral results were obtained from the Ministry of Interior, Directorate 
of Elections. However, as already mentioned, mayoral candidates do not officially belong to 
any party. To trace their affiliation, we used electoral data and newspapers of that era that 
Professor Ilias Nicolacopoulos -the most prominent electoral analyst in Greece- shared with us 
from his personal collection.  
During the period under consideration, we have elected mayors and mayoral candidates 
from all political parties of Metapolitefsi. It should be noted though that in some municipalities 
we have the so called ‘independent’ candidates of the two parties who were running despite 
the fact that other candidates had the ‘official’ endorsement. On average, around 88 percent of 
candidate mayors who obtain one of the first two places in the electoral races of our sample are 
affiliated with ND or PASOK, whereas 4 percent of these cases are linked with independent 
candidates of the two parties. The rest of our sample is composed by candidates who are 
affiliated with the Communist Party of Greece (KKE – Komounistiko Komma Elladas) with 
6.5 percent, the Coalition of the Left, of Movements and Ecology (Synaspismos) with 2.4 
 
23 So, after the local election of 1978, the variable subsidiesit is calculated as the average amount of subsidies 
received by municipality i between 1979-1981. We have decided to exclude the year of next municipal election 
from this calculation, as the party in power changed 2 times between 1978-1990 (October 1981 and October 1989) 
affecting the political alignment of the mayor for the average we calculate.  
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percent, the centrist EK-ND with 1.5 percent, whereas the remaining 1.5 percent belongs to 
independent candidates or cases that affiliation is uncertain. Overall, in our sample we have 
data for 1165 electoral races. To implement the RDD, we restrict the sample to municipalities 
with electoral races of only two candidates with the following characteristics24: (i) they are 
official or independent candidates of ND and PASOK; (ii) they belong to ND and EK-ND, as 
the latter party was absorbed by PASOK in the transition of its growing influence; (iii) the first 
two places belong to ND and Synaspismos candidates. The logic is that in many cases PASOK 
and left-wing Synaspismos endorsed the same candidate in municipal elections. These 
restrictions are of paramount importance, as alignment (or nonalignment) will have a different 
meaning if for instance the first two places belong to candidates of the same party (see e.g., 
Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Fabre, 2014). Following these restrictions, we end up with 361 
electoral races that took place in 196 municipalities around Greece. Figure B4, in Appendix B, 
shows the spatial allocation of these municipalities within the Greek territory. It should be 
noted that 104, 92, 42 and 123 of these 361 electoral races took place in 1978, 1982, 1986 and 
1990 local elections, respectively. Also, in 155 of these races (42 percent of the sample) 
candidates of ND won, whereas in the remaining 206 races candidates of PASOK (191), 
Synaspismos (9) and EK-ND (6) won the mandate. Our forcing variable in the RDD is defined 
as the victory margin of the mayoral candidate aligned with the central government party in 
power in each municipality i and term t (VMit). Consequently, the (political) alignment variable 
(Αit) equals to 1 when this measure is positive and zero when it is negative. 
Finally, we control for some variables that are likely to play a role in the allocation of 
subsidies. In particular, we use the census of 1981 to reproduce the set of covariates, Xi, namely 
population, electricity, agriculture, and illiterates, as employed in the prefectural analysis. In 
addition, we use a second set of covariates (𝑍𝑖𝑡) to control for political characteristics. To this 
end, we use the variable victory margin defined as the difference of valid votes between the 
incumbent and opposition parties in the last national election. Then, we calculate the share of 
absent voters from the electoral process (abstention) defined as the share of voters to the total 
number of registered voters. We also include two variables that capture mayoral characteristics: 
(i) the number of times a candidate has been elected as mayor since the drop of the military 
regime (experience); (ii) a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in cases the winner of the last 
mayoral election runs as candidate and 0 otherwise (candidate). Explicit definitions, 
 




descriptive statistics and sources of the variables employed throughout the municipal analysis 
are provided in Table B2 in Appendix B. 
In Table B3, in Appendix B, we summarize the main variables of the analysis 
comparing the sample means of the municipalities that have a mayor who is politically aligned 
with the government (columns 1-2) and the municipalities that have a mayor who is not aligned 
with the government (columns 3-4). We also report the p-value of the corresponding t-test for 
equality of these means. As it can be seen, even a simple comparison of means indicates a 
statistically significant positive difference of the average (discretionary) subsidies received by 
the municipalities with a politically aligned mayor. On the other hand, non-discretionary 
subsidies are at the same level for aligned and non-aligned municipalities.  
 
4.3. Identification: Regression discontinuity design 
Estimating the impact of political alignment on the amount of subsidies can be affected by 
endogeneity issues, such as socio-economic factors influencing both dimensions. To deal with 
this issue, we adapt the RDD in close electoral races pioneered by Lee (2008). In particular, 
Lee (2008) uses the US House elections as an empirical illustration, showing that winners in 
close electoral races exhibit quasi-random variation that allows for the identification of causal 
effects of political parties.25 
Following this methodology, we can compare the municipalities for which the aligned 
candidate barely won to municipalities for which the candidate barely lost. To do so, we use 
the variable 𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡 defined above, where at the threshold cut-off point (𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 0) the political 
alignment (Ait) sharply increases from 0 to 1. Then, we employ a spline polynomial 
specification which consists of running a Pth-order polynomial function in VMit on either side 
of the threshold VMit = 0, as follows: 
 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑝𝑘=0 +  𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑝𝑘=0 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (4) 
 
where 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the amount of subsidies received by municipality 𝑖 during term 𝑡 (i.e., 
1979-81, 1983-85, 1987-89, and 1991-93); 𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑘  is the margin of victory of the mayor of 
municipality i in the last local election during the year t (i.e., 1978, 1982, 1986, and 1990); 𝐴𝑖𝑡 
takes the value 1 when the mayor is aligned with the central government and 0 otherwise; 𝑋𝑖 
 
25 See Brollo and Nannicini (2012) for a more detailed discussion. Also, an increasing number of scholars employ 
RDD in similar context; see, among others, Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), Meyersson (2014), Beland (2015), 
Brollo and Troiano (2016), Fiva and Halse (2016), Lara and Toro (2019). 
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(𝑍𝑖𝑡) is the set of socio-economic (political) characteristics described above; and 𝑚𝑡 are 
mayoral term-fixed effects. Also, standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. In this 
setting, the estimated coefficient, ?̂?0, identifies the average treatment effect at the zero 
threshold. Therefore, a political bias of the central government towards the politically aligned 
mayoral candidate is indicated when ?̂?0 > 0.  
Based on the generic specification, described in Equation (4), we employ various 
specifications. In particular, we adopt a linear regression model with 𝑝 = 1 as well as second, 
third and fourth-order polynomials. We consider these models, firstly, without additional 
covariates and, secondly, including the set of covariates described in the previous section. As 
an alternative, we apply a local linear regression which restricts the sample to municipalities in 
the interval VMit ∈ [−h,+h] and estimates the model: 
 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽0𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (5) 
 
where the optimal bandwidth h is computed as in Calonico et al. (2014). As above, the 
coefficient of interest is ?̂?0.  
Before we move to our main results and robustness checks, we start with two validity 
tests. First, we examine whether the density of our running variable, 𝑉𝑀𝑖𝑡, is continuous at the 
discontinuity threshold (i.e., VMit = 0). To check this, we follow the McCrary (2008) 
methodology that tests the null hypothesis of continuity employing kernel local linear 
regressions of the logarithm of the density separately on both sides of the cut-off. As can be 
seen in Figure 6, we cannot reject continuity in the running variable at the win/loss threshold, 
indicating that ruling party mayoral candidates do not have the ability to selectively push 
themselves across the win margin. Second, we have to ensure that municipalities just below 
and above the cut-off are similar. To this end, we examine whether there is no discontinuity in 
our covariates between municipalities narrowly won and narrowly lost by ruling party 
candidates. Table 3 presents the results, showing that all variables are balanced across the cut-
off. These results are corroborated by visual inspection in Figure 7. Consistent with Table 3, 
there is no noticeable difference in our covariates across the cut-off.  
 
 
[Insert Table 3, here] 
 




4.4. Baseline Results 
In this section, we describe our RDD results as reported in Table 4. Our baseline estimates 
include simple OLS regressions (columns 1-2), RDD regressions described in Equation (4) 
using a third order spline polynomial specification (columns 3-4), and local linear regressions 
described in Equation (5) with optimal bandwidth calculated according to Calonico et al. 
(2014) (columns 5-6). For each model, we report a specification with no covariates (columns 
1, 3, 5) and a specification that includes the full set of our controls (columns 2, 4, 6). Across 
all specifications, we have positive and statistically significant estimates, indicating that 
mayors politically aligned with the government receive larger amounts of subsidies. In 
particular, according to the OLS, spline polynomial, and local linear regressions with the full 
set of covariates (columns 2, 4, 6) mayors affiliated with the central government attract about 
82, 200 and 140 percent, respectively, more subsidies than their non-affiliated counterparts. 
These results are confirmed by visual inspection of Figure 8, which shows that the subsidies to 
aligned municipalities increase significantly for positive values of victory margin around the 
cut-off. At the same time, we have evidence that the central government gives more money to 
its strongholds (where VΜit is large), although we cannot discern with certainty if political 
motivations (i.e., core voter strategy as predicted by Cox and McCubbins, 1986) shape this 
result. 
 
[Insert Table 4, here] 
[Insert Figure 8, here] 
 
4.5 Robustness Checks 
Our first robustness check in Table 5 is to experiment with additional specifications. In 
particular, the first four columns present results of polynomial estimations for all orders 
between 1 and 4 (each column corresponds to a specific order). Moreover, columns (5)-(7) 
show the results of local linear regressions for the optimal bandwidth defined by Calonico et 
al. (2014), half, and quarter of it. Due to space limitations, we have omitted the corresponding 
specifications that exclude the covariates since the results are qualitatively similar. As before, 
we see that our overall conclusion is robust to the polynomial order as well as the bandwidth 
choice.  
 




Second, we re-run specifications of Table 4 using non-discretionary subsidies as our 
dependent variable. Since these subsidies are allocated in a fair and transparent way, we do not 
expect to find evidence of political bias. Indeed, we see in Table 6 that the coefficient for the 
political alignment variable, 𝐴𝑖𝑡, is not statistically significant in any specification. Also, visual 
inspection of Figure B5 does not indicate political distortions. This confirms our main finding 
that, when the central government has full discretion, political bias affects the allocation of 
funds. 
[Insert Table 6, here] 
 
 
In Tables B7, B8 and Figure B6 in Appendix B, we present two additional robustness 
checks of the RDD estimates: (i) we investigate whether political alignment has a differentiated 
effect on subsidies along five dimensions (e.g., population size of municipality); (ii) we 
perform a placebo test using alternative cut-off points. Additional discussions of these tests are 
provided in Section A2 in Appendix A. Overall, our findings about the effect of political 
alignment on subsidies remain unaffected. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The evolution of the Greek economy during the post-war period presents a clear-cut policy 
regime change and a radical downturn in macroeconomic performance during Metapolitefsi.  
Several scholars suggest that the democratic political system established after 1974 failed to 
create commitment and coordination mechanisms that would ensure economic growth. In 
contrast, it produced an economic environment that discouraged private investment through 
increased uncertainty, while it prioritized politically motivated redistributive policies (see 
Kostis, 2019; Meghir et al., 2017). In particular, after 1974, social groups that were at the 
margin of society and politics in the pre-Metapolitefsi era (e.g., small business owners, and 
small farmers) gained significant political power, whereas elected governments were striving 
to satisfy their ‘fiscal’ demands.  
In this new era, the parties that emerged diverged substantially from their predecessors 
in structure, functioning and program. This is because old-style parties of notables that were 
lacking autonomous organization and mass memberships could not survive any longer. To this 
end, both dominant political parties (i.e., ND and PASOK) put significant efforts to organize a 
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centralized party machine in order to mobilize voters through mass memberships. One 
significant fiscal tool to develop and support their party machine was intergovernmental 
transfers to prefectures and municipalities that increased markedly between 1974-1993 
contributing to the fiscal derailment of the Greek state. Building on a novel regional dataset 
and employing DD and RDD estimation techniques, our analysis provides strong evidence that 
governing parties diverted significant amounts of intergovernmental transfers towards their 
political strongholds and politically aligned mayors. In the transformed political environment, 
both appointed prefects and mayors became major components of the party machine and were 
functioned as arms of the governing party “at the level of the town and the village”. Overall, 
our findings support the notion that political distortions during the first two decades of 





Alogoskoufis, G. (1995). The two faces of Janus: Institutions. Policy regimes and 
macroeconomic performance. Economic Policy 10, 147-192.  
Alogoskoufis, G. (2019). Greece and the Euro: A Mundellian Tragedy. GreeSE – Hellenic 
Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 136, Hellenic Observatory, LSE.  
Anaxagorou, C. Efthyvoulou, G. and Sarantides, V. (2020). Electoral motives and the 
subnational allocation of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa, European Economic Review, 
127, 103430. 
Carruthers, C., and Wanamaker, M. (2015). Municipal housekeeping: The impact of women's 
suffrage on public education. Journal of Human Resources, 50(4), 837-872.  
Beland, L.-P., and Oloomi, S. (2017). Party affiliation and public spending: evidence from U.S. 
governors. Economic Inquiry, 55(2), 982-995. 
Brender, A., and Drazen, A. (2007). Why is economic policy different in new democracies? 
Affecting attitudes. NBER Working Paper No. 13457.  
Brollo, F., and Nannicini, T. (2012). Tying your enemy’s hands in close races: The politics of 
federal transfers in Brazil. The American Political Science Review, 106(4), 742-761. 
Brollo, F., and Troiano, U. (2016). What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence 
from close races in Brazil. Journal of Development Economics, 122, 28-45. 
Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M.D., and Titiunik, R. (2014). Robust nonparametric confidence 
intervals for regression-discontinuity designs. Econometrica, 82(6), 2295-2326. 
Cox, G., and McCubbins, M. (1986). Electoral politics as a redistributive game. Journal of 
Politics, 48 (2), 370-389. 
Chortareas, G., Logothetis, V. and Papandreou, A. (2016). Political budget cycles and 
reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities, European Journal of Political Economy, 
43(C), 1-13. 
Christodoulakis, N. (2015). Country failure and social grievances in the Greek Civil War 1946-
1949: An economic approach, Defence and Peace Economics, 26(4), 383-407.  
Christofilopoulou, P. (1991). Local government reform in Greece, in: J. J. Hesse (Ed.) Local 
Government and Urban Affairs in International Perspective, 551–572 (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos). 
Elephantis, A. (1981). PASOK and the Elections of the 1977: The Rise of the Populist 
Movement, in Howard R. Penniman, ed., Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of 
1974 and 1977 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research). 
Fabre, B. (2014). Political Connections and Alignment: Evidence from Intergovernmental 
Grants in France, Paris School of Economics, mimeo. 
Ferreira, F., and Gyourko, L. (2009). Do political parties matter? Evidence from U.S. cities. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(1), 399-422. 
Fiva, J.H., and Halse, A.H. (2016). Local favoritism in at-large proportional representation 
systems. Journal of Public Economics, 143, 15-26. 
Hering, G. (2008). The Political Parties in Greece, 1821-1936. MIET (in Greek) 
Hlepas, N.-K. (2003) Local government reform in Greece, in: N. Kersting and A. Vetter (Eds) 
Reforming Local Government in Europe. Closing the Gap between Democracy and 
Efficiency, 221–239 (Opladen: Leske and Budrich). 
Hlepas, N.-K. and Getimis, P. (2010). Greece: a case of fragmented centralism and ‘behind the 
scenes’ localism, in: J. Loughlin, F. Hendriks and A. Lidstro¨m (Eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
Hlepas N.K., Getimis P. (2011). Impacts of Local Government Reforms in Greece: An Interim 
Assessment, Local Government Studies, 37, (5): 517-532. 
25 
 
Jablonski, R. (2014). How aid targets votes: The impact of electoral incentives on foreign aid 
distribution. World Politics, 66(2), 1-39. 
Joanis, M. (2011). The road to power: Partisan loyalty and the centralized provision of local 
infrastructure, Public Choice, 146, (1-2), 117-143. 
Kalyvas, S. (2015). Modern Greece: What everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press.  
Kammas, P., Poulima, M. and Sarantides, V. (2020). Investing in long-run partisan loyalty: 
Empirical evidence from post-dictatorial Greece, Mimeo 
Kammas, P., and Sarantides, V. (2016). Fiscal redistribution around elections when democracy 
is not “the only game in town”. Public Choice, 168 (3), 279-311. 
Katsimi, M. and Moutos, T. (2010). EMU and the Greek crisis: The political-economy 
perspective, European Journal of Political Economy, 26(4), 568-576. 
Kostis, K. (2019). The Wealth of Greece. Patakis Publishers (in Greek). 
Iordanoglou, C., (2020). The Greek Economy since 1950. Central Bank of Greece (in Greek). 
Lara, B.E., and Toro, S.M. (2019). Tactical distribution in local funding: The value of an 
aligned mayor. European Journal of Political Economy, 56, 74-89. 
Lavdas, K. (1997). The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of 
Integration, London: Macmillan.   
Lee, D.S. (2008). Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House 
elections, Journal of Econometrics, 142(2), 675-697. 
Legg, K., (1969). Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
Lockwood, B., Philippopoulos, A., and Tzavalis, E. (2001). Fiscal policy and politics: Theory 
and evidence from Greece 1960-1997. Economic Modelling, 18, 253-268.  
Linz, J., and Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern 
Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Loulis, J. (1981).  New Democracy: The New Face of Conservatism, in Howard R. Penniman, 
ed., Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of 1974 and 1977 (Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy. 
Lyrintzis, C. (1984). Political parties in post-junta Greece: A case of “bureaucratic clientelism? 
West European Politics, 7(2), 99-118. 
Mauro P., R. Romeu, A. Binder and A. Zaman (2015): A modern history of fiscal prudence 
and profligacy, Journal of Monetary Economics 76, 55-70. 
Mavrogordatos, G. (1983). The rise of the green sun: The Greek election of 1981. London: 
King’s College, Centre for Contemporary Greek Studies. 
Mavrogordatos, G. (1984). The Greek party system: a case of limited but polarized pluralism? 
West European Politics, 7(4), 156-169. 
Mavrogordatos, G. (1997). From traditional clientelism to machine politics: The impact of 
PASOK populism in Greece. South European Society and Politics, 2(3), 1-26. 
McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity 
Design: A Density Test. Journal of Econometrics, 142: 698–714. 
Meghir, C., Pissarides, C., Vayanos, D., and Vettas, N. (2017). The Greek economy before and 
during the crisis-and policy options going forward, in C. Meghir, C. A. Pissarides, D. 
Vayanos and N. Vettas (eds), Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA, chapter 1, pp. 3–72. 
Moutos, T., and Pechlivanos, L. (2015). The democratization of rent seeking in modern Greece, 
in R. Congleton and A. Hillman (Eds.), Companion to the Political Economy of Rent 
Seeking (Edward Elgar Publishing) 
Moutos, T., and Tsitsikas, C. (2010). Whither public interest: The case of Greece’s public 
finances. FinanzArchiv, 66, 170-2016.  
26 
 
Meyersson, E. (2014). Islamic rule and the empowerment of the poor and pious. Econometrica, 
82(1), 229-269. 
Meynaud, J., (2002). The Political Forces in Greece (1946-1965), 2nd ed., Savvalas, Athens 
(in Greek). 
Nicolacopoulos, I. (2001). The Weak Democracy. Parties and Elections, 1946-1967. Athens: 
Patakis Publishers (in Greek).  
Nicolacopoulos, I. (2005). Elections and voters, 1974-2004: Old cleavages and new issues. 
West European Politics, 28(2), 260-278. 
Pappas, T. (1999). Making Party Democracy in Greece (New York: Macmillan). 
Pappas, T. (2009). Patrons against partisans. The politics of patronage in mass ideological 
parties. Party Politics, 15(3), 315-334.  
Solé-Ollé, A., and Sorribas-Navarro, P. (2008). The effects of partisan alignment on the 
allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Difference-in differences estimates for Spain. 
Journal of Public Economics, 92, 625–671. 
Spenkuch, J., and Tillmann, P. (2018). Elite influence? Religion and the electoral success of 
the Nazis, American Journal of Political Science, 62(1), 19-36. 
Tatsos, N. (1998). The size of local government units, local government papers, Vol. 1, 




Figure 1. Government debt between 1967-1993 
 
Notes: The first blue dashed line indicates the year that democracy is restored and ND came to power up to 1981 
(i.e., 1974-81). The green dashed line indicates the year that the socialist party PASOK came to power after the 
election of 1981 up to 1989. The second blue dashed line indicates the win of ND in the elections of 1990. 




Figure 2. Government Primary Expenditure, Revenues and Primary Balance (%GDP) 
over time. 
 






Figure 3. Government Primary Expenditure, Revenues and Primary Balance (%GDP): 
Election vs non-election years 
 





Figure 4. The evolution of prefectural expenses 
 
Notes: The green dashed line indicates the year that the socialist party PASOK came to power after the election 
of 1981 up to 1989. The blue dashed line indicates the year that ND came back to power in 1990. Fiscal data are 






Figure 5. The evolution of subsidies to municipalities 
 
Notes: The green dashed line indicates the year that the socialist party PASOK came to power after the election 
of 1981 up to 1989. The blue dashed line indicates the year that ND came back to power in 1990. Fiscal data are 
obtained by the annual volumes of the final fiscal accounts of the Greek municipalities available in the Digital 











Figure 6. McCrary (2008) test for no discontinuity at the cut-off 
 
Notes: This figure shows the estimated density of the victory margin of aligned mayors in municipal elections and 



















Figure 7. Balanced covariate checks  
 
Notes: The black line is a split third-order polynomial in victory margin of the aligned mayor candidate, fitted 
separately on each side of the victory margin thresholds at zero – i.e., MVit >0 (MVit < 0) when the winner 
candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is aligned (non-aligned) with the central government. The grey lines 





Figure 8. The effect of political alignment on discretionary subsidies  
 
Notes: The black line is a split third-order polynomial in victory margin of the aligned mayor candidate, fitted 
separately on each side of the victory margin thresholds at zero – i.e., MVit >0 (MVit < 0) when the winner 
candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is aligned (non-aligned) with the central government. The grey lines 




Table 1. Political support and the allocation of prefectural expenses around elections (Fixed-
Effects) 
election variable No interaction National 
election year 
National election and pre-
election years 
  (1) (2) 
victory margin 0.148** 0.138* 0.089 
 (0.073) (0.070) (0.240) 
victory margin*election  0.034 0.103* 
  (0.572) (0.084) 
Observations 988 988 988 
R2 0.944 0.944 0.944 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of Equations (1) and (2). Prefecture and year fixed effects are included. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real per capita prefectural expenses. All models control for the 
population, electricity, agriculture, and illiterates, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust 
standard errors, clustered by prefecture, are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 









Table 2. Political support and the allocation of prefectural expenses (DD) 
party in power PASOK ND 
victory margin  victory margin1981 victory margin1974 
sample 1975-89 1978-85 1975-89 1978-85 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
party*victory margin 0.629** 0.454** 0.232* 0.185** 
 (0.261) (0.184) (0.117) (0.090) 
Observations 780 416 780 416 
R2 0.935 0.880 0.933 0.878 
Notes: The table reports DD coefficient estimates of Equation (3). Prefecture and year fixed effects are included. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real per capita prefectural expenses. All models control for the 
population, electricity, agriculture, and illiterates, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust 
standard errors, clustered by prefecture, are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 














Table 3. Discontinuities of main covariates in close races (RDD) 
 experience candidate abstention victory 
margin 
population electricity agriculture illiterates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
alignment -0.212 -0.027 0.010 0.005 758.879 -0.003 -0.034 -0.014 
 (0.183) (0.147) (0.033) (0.046) (6200.854) (0.020) (0.028) (0.013) 
Observations 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 361 
R2 0.091 0.008 0.046 0.140 0.036 0.031 0.041 0.046 
Notes: Column titles refer to the dependent variable. This table shows RDD estimates of Equation (4) using a 
third order spline polynomial specification. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in 





Table 4. Baseline Results using OLS, spline polynomial and LLR 
specification: OLS Spline polynomial LLR 
covariates: No Yes No Yes No Yes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
alignment 0.861*** 0.601*** 1.132*** 1.104*** 0.948** 0.878*** 
  (0.144) (0.132) (0.405) (0.333) (0.373) (0.314) 
Observations 361 361 361 361 207 210 
R2 0.071 0.361 0.081 0.369 0.076 0.347 
Optimal h     0.129 0.130 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real per capita (discretionary) subsidies. This table 
shows results for OLS, RDD third order spline polynomial and local linear regressions with optimal bandwidth 
calculated as in Calonico et al. (2014). RDD specifications with split polynomial and local linear regression 
following Equations (4) and (5), respectively. h denotes the interval of our running variable. For instance, h=0.129 
represents races where margin of victory is between -12.9% and 12.9%. Columns (2), (4) and (6) control for the 
experience, candidate, abstention, victory margin, population, electricity, agriculture, illiterates, and term fixed 
effects but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality 






Table 5. Alternative RDD specifications 
specification Spline polynomial LLR 
polynomial p(1) p(2) p(3) p(4) p(1) p(1) p(1) 
bandwidth Global Global Global Global ℎ̂ ℎ̂/2 ℎ̂/4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
alignment 0.763*** 0.726*** 1.104*** 1.057** 0.878*** 1.202*** 1.372* 
 (0.195) (0.253) (0.333) (0.429) (0.314) (0.430) (0.737) 
Observations 361 361 361 361 210 115 56 
R2 0.363 0.364 0.369 0.370 0.347 0.436 0.598 
Optimal h     0.130 0.065 0.032 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real per capita (discretionary) subsidies. Columns 
(1)-(4) show results for first, second, third and fourth order spline polynomials as described in Equation (4). 
Column (5) shows local linear regressions with optimal bandwidth calculated as in Calonico et al. (2014). h 
denotes the interval of our running variable. For instance, h=0.13 represents races where margin of victory is 
between −13.0% and 13.0%. Columns (6)-(7) show estimates for half and quarter of the optimal bandwidth 
defined by Calonico et al. (2014). All models control for the experience, candidate, abstention, victory margin, 
population, electricity, agriculture, and illiterates, and term fixed effects but these coefficients are not reported to 
save space. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 





Table 6. The effect of alignment on non-discretionary subsidies 
specification OLS Spline polynomial LLR 
covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
alignment 0.034 -0.001 0.027 -0.012 0.069 0.014 
 (0.047) (0.030) (0.135) (0.079) (0.114) (0.099) 
Observations 361 361 361 361 241 146 
R2 0.001 0.657 0.017 0.663 0.020 0.673 
Optimal h     0.154 0.088 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real per capita non-discretionary subsidies. Columns 
(1)-(6) follow the structure of Table 4. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in 






A1. Robustness checks of the DD specification 
In Table B6, we present modifications of the estimates of Table 2 in order to check further the 
consistency of our results. First, we express the political support variable victory margin as 
percentage of valid votes cast instead of the voting eligible population that was reported in the 
results of Table 2. As can be seen in columns (1) and (6) of Table B6, both DD coefficients for 
the two parties in power remain positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Second, 
in columns (2) and (7) we rerun estimates of Table 3 after removing observations with 
standardized residuals above 1.96 or below -1.96. Our new estimates indicate that our results 
are not driven by outlier observations. Third, in columns (3) and (8) we expand our sample 
between 1975-1993 as in Table 1. The reason we decided to limit our sample, between 1975-
1989, in the DD specification is to focus on the terms of ND and PASOK just before and after 
the political change of 1981. However, as it can be seen, both DD coefficients in the expanded 
sample remain positive and statistically significant. Fourth, we allow the effect of PASOK and 
ND administration to vary over two horizons during their terms in office as follows: 
 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 1 ∙ 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 2 ∙𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (A1)  
 
where variable 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 during the first 
terms of PASOK and ND in office (1982-1985 and 1975-1977, respectively), and 0 otherwise. 
In the same way, variable 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 2 refers to the second term of the two parties in office 
(1986-1989 and 1978-1981 for PASOK and ND respectively). Moreover, as in Equation (3), 
the variable 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 takes values of the victory margin of PASOK (ND) in the 
election of 1981 (1974). As can be seen in column (4), both DD coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant, though it should be noted that the second term of PASOK (1986-1989) 
seems to produce a stronger effect on prefectural expenses. In column (9), focusing on ND 
administration, both coefficients are of the same level, though the effect of the first term (1975-
1977) is marginally insignificant. Finally, it remains possible that heterogeneous trends are 
present and induced changes in prefectural expenses in prefectures which voted more 
intensively for PASOK - even before 1982 when the socialist party came to power. To examine 
this possibility, we restrict our sample prior to 1982 and assess the importance of our key 
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independent variable in determining trends in prefectural expenses. Specifically, we modify 
Equation (3) and, focusing on the fiscal years 1975-1981, we estimate:  
 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 ∙ 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛1981 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (A2) 
 
The main aim is to test whether high victory margin1981 prefectures had different trends before 
1982 (i.e., 𝛼2≠0). The results reported in column (5) show an upward trend in prefectural 
expenses, but more importantly no evidence of a differential trend related to the size of victory 
margin1981. We do not test the hypothesis of pre-existing trends in the case of ND since its 
terms are ahead of PASOK’s administration.  
 
A2. Robustness checks of the RDD specification 
In Table B7, we investigate the potential heterogeneity of the impact of political alignment on 
discretionary subsidies. To do so, we conduct an RDD analysis allowing the discontinuity to 
be different along five dimensions. That is, we estimate Equation (4) augmented with an 
additional term and the interaction between the political alignment variable and this term for 
five different cases. First, we distinguish the periods that ND (1978-1981 and 1990-1993) and 
PASOK (1982-1985 and 1986-1989) were in power. It would be interesting to investigate 
whether one of the two parties drives the political alignment effect. To this end, we use the 
variable ND that takes the value 1 when ND is in power and 0 otherwise. Second, we examine 
if the municipality size is an important factor which affects the way governments allocate 
subsidies. If larger municipalities receive higher amounts of subsidies, it could be argued that 
this may not be the effect of political bias. To perform this test, we construct the variable 
population above the median that takes the value 1 if a municipality has population above 4,000 
citizens, and 0 otherwise. Third, we use the variable candidate to distinguish cases that the 
mayor runs for re-election or not. It would be interesting to observe whether the central 
government differentiates its behaviour along this dimension. Fourth, we focus on the issue of 
political strongholds. We define political strongholds as municipalities that voted in favour of 
the political party in power with a margin of victory greater than 20 percent (upper quarter of 
the distribution) in the last national elections. In that way, we can check if the political 
alignment matters, but only in the political strongholds of the incumbent. Fifth, we check 
whether our result is driven by the level of voter turnout. In other words, we examine if higher 
voter turnout affects the behavior of the central government to allocate subsidies in aligned 
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mayors at the threshold. To do so, we construct the variable turnout above median that takes 
the value 1 for municipalities with abstention rate below 23.84 percent, and 0 otherwise. As 
can be seen in columns (1)-(5) of Table B7, our results on political alignment do not seem to 
be affected significantly by a specific political party, municipality size, lame ducks, political 
strongholds and high turnout levels. 
 Our last robustness check is to perform a placebo test following Imbens and Lemieux 
(2008). In particular, we estimate the political alignment effect at false thresholds where no 
effect should exist. To this end, we use as alternative cut-off points the median on the left and 
right side of zero threshold. The values which correspond to these alternative thresholds are -
0.116 and 0.112 respectively. Table B8 presents the results of a third-order spline polynomial 
for the new threshold on the left (columns 1-2), the true threshold (columns 3-4), and the new 
threshold on the right (columns 5-6). As it can be seen, our empirical evidence suggests that 
discontinuities do not exist at these alternative cut-off points. This indicates that our results are 
valid due to a causal relationship and not by pure randomness. Figure B8 provides a visual 




Appendix B. Additional Figures and Tables 
 
Figure B1. The evolution of subsidies to municipalities 
 
Notes: The green dashed line indicates the year that the socialist party PASOK came to power after the election 
of 1981 up to 1989. The blue dashed line indicates the year that ND came back to power in 1990. Fiscal data are 
obtained by the annual volumes of the final fiscal accounts of the Greek municipalities available in the Digital 




Figure B2. Political influence of ND and PASOK at the prefecture level (NUTS-3) 
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Figure B3. Municipal (LAU-1) and communal (LAU-2) boundaries of Greece  
 
Notes: Red polygons indicate all the municipalities of our sample. The light grey lines indicate boundaries of smaller administrative divisions such as communities. 
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Figure B4. Sample of municipalities for the RDD analysis 
 
Notes: Red polygons indicate the 196 municipalities of our sample in the RDD analysis. Grey polygons indicate municipalities that do not appear in the sample. 
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Figure B5. The effect of political alignment on non-discretionary subsidies   
 






Figure B6. True vs false electoral thresholds (Placebo Tests) 
 
Notes: This graph shows the effect of alignment on subsidies based on the specifications of columns (2), (4) and (6) in 




Table B1. Definition of variables, data sources and descriptive statistics (Prefectural Level of Analysis) 
Variable name Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max Source 
prefectural expenses Total prefectural expenses, 
expressed in real per capital terms 
988 3345.209 2570.246 462.250 19888.424 Final fiscal 
accounts of the 
Greek state 
available in the 
Bank of Greece 
(BoG) 
victory margin The difference between 
incumbent share and opposition 
share. The former is measured as 
the valid votes for the incumbent 
party as a share of the voting-
eligible population. The latter is 
measured as the valid votes for 
the opposition party (parties) as a 
share of the voting-eligible 
population. Between 1975-1981 
the opposition is composed by 
vote shares received by the two 
leading opposition parties (i.e., 
EK-ND and PASOK), whereas 
between 1982-1993 by the 
leading opposition party ND. 





victory margin  
(valid votes) 
The difference between 
incumbent share (valid votes) and 
opposition share (valid votes) 
988 0.080 0.141 -0.405 0.556  
election =1 in years of national elections, 
and 0 otherwise 
988 0.316 0.465 0.000 1.000  
election  
(prelections years) 
=1 in years and prelection years 
of national elections, and 0 
otherwise 
988 0.579 0.494 0.000 1.000  
PASOK =1 in years between 1982-1989, 
when PASOK was in power, and 
0 otherwise 
988 0.421 0.494 0.000 1.000  
PASOK (term 1) =1 in years between 1982-1985, 
when PASOK was in power, and 
0 otherwise 
988 0.211 0.408 0.000 1.000  
PASOK (term 2) =1 in years between 1986-1989, 
when PASOK was in power, and 
0 otherwise 
988 0.211 0.408 0.000 1.000  
victory margin1981 Valid votes that PASOK received 
in the election of 1981 as a share 
of the voting-eligible population 
988 0.072 0.093 -0.142 0.381  
victory margin1981 
(valid votes) 
Valid votes that PASOK received 
in the election of 1981 as a share 
of the valid votes cast 
988 0.089 0.116 -0.192 0.462  
ND =1 in years between 1975-1981 
and 1990-1993, when ND was in 
power, and 0 otherwise 
988 0.579 0.494 0.000 1.000  
ND(term 1) =1 in years between 1975-1977, 
when ND was in power, and 0 
otherwise 
988 0.158 0.365 0.000 1.000  
ND(term 2) =1 in years between 1978-1981, 
when ND was in power, and 0 
otherwise 
988 0.211 0.408 0.000 1.000  
victory margin1974 Valid votes that ND received in 
the election of 1974 as a share of 
the voting-eligible population 
988 0.169 0.147 -0.323 0.431  
victory margin1974 
(valid votes) 
Valid votes that ND received in 
the election of 1974 as a share of 
the valid votes cast 
988 0.217 0.187 -0.405 0.556  
population Total population at the prefecture 
level expressed in thousands 
988 189.301 420.777 20.993 3150.807  





electricity  The share of households with 
access to electricity 
988 0.951 0.056 0.505 1.001 
agriculture  The share of individuals 
employed in the agricultural 
sector 
988 0.384 0.155 0.006 0.734 
illiterates  The share of illiterate individuals  988 0.112 0.043 0.033 0.285 




Table B2. Definition of variables, data sources and descriptive statistics (Municipal Level of Analysis) 
Variable name Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max  
subsidies Total discretionary 
subsidies from the central 
government, expressed in 
real per capital terms 
361 2391.149 2589.566 0.000 16016.331 
Digital library 




non-discretionary subsidies Total non-discretionary 
subsidies from the central 
government, expressed in 
real per capital terms 
361 1167.492 577.173 209.043 3832.327 
alignment = 1 if the mayor is 
aligned with the central 
government, and 0 
otherwise 
361 0.546 0.499 0.000 1.000 Ilias 
Nicolacopoulos 
data 
VM The difference of the vote 
share between the aligned 
and non-aligned mayor 
candidates  





experience Number of terms the 
mayor has served since 
the restoration of 
democracy 
361 1.654 0.795 1.000 5.000 
candidate =1 if the mayor runs for 
re-election, and 0 
otherwise 
361 0.698 0.460 0.000 1.000 
abstention The share of absent voters 
from the electoral process 
361 0.256 0.107 0.018 0.808 
turnout above median =1 for municipalities that 
the level belong in the 
first quarter of the 
distribution according to 
the variable abstention, 
and 0 otherwise 
361 0.498 0.502 0.000 1.000 
victory margin The difference between 
incumbent  and 
opposition parties share 
of votes in the national 
elections  
361 0.089 0.172 -0.525 0.595 
political strongholds =1 for municipalities that 
belong in the fourth 
quarter of the distribution 
according to the variable 
victory margin, and 0 
otherwise 
361 0.252 0.435 0.000 1.000 
ND =1 in years between 
1975-1981 and 1990-
1993, when ND was in 
power, and 0 otherwise 
361 0.629 0.484 0.000 1.000 
population Total population at the 
prefecture level expressed 
in thousands 
361 10369.305 25675.799 189.000 4.06e+05 
Digital library 




population above median =1 for municipalities with 
values in population 
above the median, and 0 
otherwise 
361 0.499 0.501 0.000 1.000 
electricity The share of households 
with access to electricity 
361 0.907 0.086 0.340 1.019 
agriculture The share of individuals 
employed in the 
agricultural sector 
361 0.118 0.105 0.000 0.446 
illiterates The share of illiterate 
individuals  
361 0.096 0.045 0.008 0.264 





Table B3. Testing for difference between means of aligned and non-aligned municipalities  
Aligned Obs. Non-Aligned Obs. p-Value 
subsidies 7.307 197 6.445 164 0.000 
non-discretionary subsidies 6.967 197 6.934 164 0.503 
experience 1.574 197 1.75 164 0.036 
candidate 0.711 197 0.683 164 0.569 
abstention 0.257 197 0.255 164 0.852 
victory margin 0.134 197 0.036 164 0.000 
population 6908.36 197 1.50E+04 164 0.005 
electricity  0.898 197 0.918 164 0.029 
agriculture  0.125 197 0.109 164 0.166 





Table B4. Political support and the allocation of prefectural expenses: Political support variables as 
shares of valid votes cast 
election variable No interaction National election 
year 
National election and 
preelection years 
  (1) (2) 
victory margin 0.120** 0.113* 0.075 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) 
victory margin*election  0.023 0.079* 
  (0.048) (0.047) 
Observations 988 988 988 
R2 0.944 0.944 0.944 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of Equations (1) and (2). Prefecture and year fixed effects are included. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the real per capita prefectural expenses. All models control for the population, electricity, 
agriculture, and illiterates, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors, clustered by prefecture, 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
 
 
Table B5. Political support and the allocation of prefectural expenses: Testing for outliers 
election variable No interaction National election 
year 
National election and pre-
election years 
  (1) (2) 
victory margin 0.161** 0.135** 0.076 
 (0.065) (0.054) (0.058) 
victory margin*election  0.087 0.164*** 
  (0.078) (0.057) 
Observations 941 941 940 
R2 0.964 0.964 0.964 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of Equation (1). Prefecture and year fixed effects are included. In all regressions, 
we remove observations with standardized residuals above 1.96 or below -1.96. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the real per capita prefectural expenses. All models control for the population, electricity, agriculture, and 
illiterates, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors, clustered by prefecture, are reported 







Table B6. Political support and the allocation of prefectural expenses (DD): Robustness checks 
party in power PASOK ND 
victory margin victory margin1981 victory margin1974 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
party*victory margin 0.463** 0.432*** 0.502**   0.203** 0.181** 0.148*  
 (0.208) (0.133) (0.247)   (0.094) (0.085) (0.081)  
party term 1*victory margin    0.439**     0.237 
    (0.214)     (0.150) 
party term 2*victory margin    0.828**     0.228** 
    (0.325)     (0.111) 
trend     0.052**     
     (0.021)     
trend* victory margin     0.001     
     (0.038)     
Observations 780 743 988 780 416 780 746 988 780 
R2 0.934 0.959 0.945 0.935 0.719 0.933 0.958 0.944 0.933 
Notes: Columns (1) and (6) list the DD coefficient estimates of Equation (3). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real per capita prefectural expenses. In 
comparison to estimates in Table 2, the variables victory margin for the terms of PASOK and ND are expressed as percentages of valid votes cast (instead of the voting eligible 
population). Columns (2) and (7) list the DD coefficient estimates of Equation (3), after removing observations with standardized residuals above 1.96 or below -1.96. Columns 
(3) and (8) list the DD coefficient estimates of Equation (3), after expanding the sample between 1975-1993 (instead of 1975-1989 applied in Table 2). In columns (4) and (9) 
we split the DD coefficient in two sub-periods for each party that was in power – i.e., 1982-1985 and 1986-1989 during PASOK administration, and 1975-1977 and 1978-1981 
during ND administration.  Finally, in column (5) we test the parallel trend hypothesis for the administration of PASOK. In particular, we test whether high victory margin1981 
prefectures had different trends before 1982. Prefecture and year fixed effects are included in all columns but column (5) includes only prefecture fixed effects. All models 
control for the population, electricity, agriculture, and illiterates, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors, clustered by prefecture, are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
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Table B7. RDD heterogeneity 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
alignment 0.748 1.360*** 1.627*** 1.167*** 0.896* 
 (0.492) (0.510) (0.605) (0.366) (0.545) 
variable -2.340*** -0.299 0.463 0.443 -0.568 
 (0.543) (0.559) (0.559) (0.850) (0.577) 
alignment*variable 0.501 -0.566 -0.780 0.468 0.475 
 (0.625) (0.701) (0.703) (0.938) (0.723) 
Observations 361 361 361 361 361 
R2 0.386 0.415 0.376 0.386 0.390 
Notes: Column titles refer to the variable that is interacted with the variable alignment. This table shows RDD 
estimates of Equation (4) using a third order spline polynomial specification. All models control for the 
experience, candidate, abstention, victory margin, population, electricity, agriculture, and illiterates, and term 
fixed effects but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 






Table B8. True vs false electoral thresholds (Placebo tests) 
covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
alignment -0.331 0.076 1.048*** 1.104*** -0.977 -0.183 
  (2.558) (2.283) (0.337) (0.333) (1.830) (1.802) 
Observations 164 164 361 361 197 197 
R2 0.308 0.444 0.302 0.369 0.229 0.280 
cut-off -0.116 -0.116 0 0 0.112 0.112 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real per capita (discretionary) subsidies. This table 
shows RDD estimates of Equation (4) using a third order spline polynomial specification. Columns (2), (4) and 
(6) control for the experience, candidate, abstention, victory margin, population, electricity, agriculture, 
illiterates, and term fixed effects but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
1% level respectively. 
 
 
